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Information searching and analysing activities conducted by securities analyst 
has remarkably improved the market pricing efficiency. China’s security market is a 
newly-emerging and transforming one, where medium-small investors and their 
transaction volume accounting for a prominent proportion. However medium-small 
investors are faced with severe information asymmetry and imperfection. Therefore, 
independency, autheniticity and fairness of securities ananlyst should be highlighted 
for its vital importance for the healthy development of China’s capital market. The 
status quo is that conflicts of interest has become the primary impediment to the 
development of China’s capital market. Securities analyst’s personal 
regulation-violation stockholding, over-optimistic forecasting and bias and 
non-independence in credit-rating are the main manifestations of conflict of interests 
in China’s securities analysing industry. This paper devotes itself to studying the 
issues on conflicts of interest in securities analysing industry and the corresponding 
governance and supervision measures. 
The paper will first describe evolution history and status quo of China’s 
securities analysing industry. A viewpoint will be brought out that the conflict of 
interests between securities analyst and securities analysing institutions is the 
primary obstacle restraining the healthy development of security analysing industry. 
On the basis of this viewpoint, this paper will discuss the main forms of conflict of 
interest—the conflict of interest between security-analysts and the conflict of interest 
existing in the entire security-analysing industry. Over-optimistism of forecasting is 
the cardinal problem for the latter conflict. Aiming at these issues mentioned above, 
this paper will further explore the soures of the conflicts and put forward 
corresponding tackling suggestions. First of all, the supervision of conflict of interest 
between security-analysts should be reinforced. Improvement of the definition of 
related parties with security-analyst and the enhancement of supervision upon 
transaction activity of thes related parties are of crucial importance. Moreover, the 














between security-analysing division and other divisions in the security company. 
With reference to regulation measures used by US securities watchdog and Wall 
Street, we further put forward our proposals on improvement of regulation system 
for conflict of interest in security-analysing industry. 
Application of representative cases and analysis of statistic data will be utilized 
to study the forms of conflict of interest in China’s security-analysing industry, and 
corresponding supervision and governance measures will be put forward. We have 
confidence that this report will manifest its reference value for China’s security 
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① 2010 年 9 月 6 日，湘财证券的分析师在研究报告中提出：中国宝安黑龙江宝安新能源投资有限公司可
为贝特瑞提供近 2.68 亿吨储量，适合于锂离子二次电池用的优质石墨矿产资源，评级为买入，随后，平
安证券、国泰君安、信达证券也先后在 2010 年 11 月 5 日、2011 年 1 月 21 日和 2 月 21 日发布了类似研
究报告。随着国泰君安等大牌券商的“加入”，中国宝安的股价开始一路飙升，并于今年 2月份到达每股
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